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THE ETHICAL ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES
OF A LAWYER-ETICIST: THE CASE OF THE
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL'S INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL
Nancy J. Moore*
INTRODUCTION~

T

AWYERS and law professors are increasingly being asked to
..Lirender opinions and advice as ethics experts or consultants. This
recent and growing phenomenon has spawned considerable confusion
regarding what one commentator calls the "ethics of ethics

consultation:" 1
ethical issues that need to be recognized and
addressed not only by "consulted lawyers,"2 but also by "consulting
lawyers."3 These issues include whether and when an attorney-client
relationship has been formed by an ethics expert,4 what duties are
owed by experts who do not form a traditional attorney-client
relationship with anyone,5 and to whom an expert's duties are owed,
* Professor of Law, Boston University. B.A., Smith College, 1970; J.D.,
Columbia University, 1973.
** Professor Samuel Dash, Georgetown University Law Center, has asked for,
and will be given, the opportunity to respond to this Article in Volume 68, Issue 4
(March 2000) of the Fordham Law Review.-Eds.
1. Drew L. Kershen, The Ethics of Ethics Consultation, 6 Professional Law. 3
(1995) [hereinafter Kershen, Ethics of Ethics]. This article sparked considerable
interest among both academics and practicing lawyers. Several years later Professor
Kershen moderated a panel discussion on the ethics of ethics consultation at the 23rd
National Conference on Professional Responsibility. The panelists, as well as the
moderator, subsequently published papers they prepared in response to the
presentation, in the 1997 Symposium Issue of the Professional Lawyer. See Timothy
P. Chinaris, The Ethics of Ethics Consultation: The Consulted Lawyer's Perspective,
1997 Symp. Issue of the Professional Law. 43; Drew L Kershen, FurtherThoughts on
the Ethics of Ethics Consultation, 1997 Symp. Issue of the Professional Law. 7
[hereinafter Kershen, Further Thoughts]; Lee A Pizzimenti, Ethical Consultation
From a Client Perspective,1997 Symp. Issue of the Professional Law. 21; Bradley F.
Tellam, The Consulted Lawyer's Perspective on the Ethics of Ethics Consultation,
Symp. Issue of the Professional Law. 55.
2. See Chinaris, supra note 1, at 43; Tellam, supra note 1, at 55.
3. See Kershen, Ethics of Ethics, supra note 1, at 1 (addressing "the ethical issues
of an ethics consultation from the perspective of the lawyer who desires to make the
inquiry").
4. See infra Part I.
5. See infra Part II.
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both inside and outside a traditional attorney-client relationship.6 Of
course, these issues are also faced by lawyer-experts who are
consulted on a wide range of matters other than lawyer ethics.
All these questions are nicely raised by the episode involving the
publication of Sam Dash's letter of resignation from his position as

"outside consultant and adviser to [Ken Starr and Starr's Office] of
Independent Counsel."'7 On November 20, 1998, Sam Dash abruptly
resigned his position.8 Starr had just concluded his testimony before
the House Judiciary Committee, which was considering the
impeachment of President Clinton based on allegations that were the
subject of a report submitted to the Committee by Starr. 9 Dash, who
had been described as Starr's "ethics adviser,"' 0 not only made the fact
of his resignation public, but also released a copy of the two-page
letter to Starr in which he explained the reasons for his resignation.
According to Dash, Starr had "violated [his] obligations under the
independent counsel statute" and had "unlawfully intruded on the
power of impeachment which the Constitution gives solely to the

House.""
Dash's views on the propriety of Starr's testimony were praised by
some and excoriated by others. 2 Among other attacks, some critics
challenged Dash, the "ethics expert," 3 for breaching his own ethical
duties toward Starr, including duties of confidentiality and loyalty. 4
Thus, one commentator, pillorying the "legal community, and other
Clinton supporters" for "applaud[ing] Dash," noted that "[i]f a lawyer
in a civil or criminal case called a press conference to announce his
resignation, saying his client is guilty, that lawyer would be in clear
violation of legal ethics."' 5 That same commentator went on to quote
6. See infra Part III.
7. Don Van Natta Jr., Starr Aide Quits Post in Protest, Austin Am.-Statesman,
Nov. 21, 1998, at Al (including full text of resignation letter). For a comprehensive
analysis of how the political context of the Starr Investigation impacted the legal
ethics issues prompted by the actions of Sam Dash and the other players in the Starr
Investigation, see generally Deborah L. Rhode, Conflicts of Commitment: Legal
Ethics in Political Context, 52 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming Jan. 2000) (manuscript on
file with author).
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. Id.; see also Letter of Resignation from Ethics Advisor, and Starr's Letter in
Response, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1998, at Al (providing Dash's letter in full).
11. Van Natta Jr., supra note 7 (quoting Dash's letter).
12. See id.; infra notes 14-24 and accompanying text. Not surprisingly, the
individual views tended to reflect the speaker's general political alignment, including
the characterization of Dash's conduct by a former Office of Independent Counsel
("OIC") staff lawyer as "an act of betrayal." Van Natta Jr., supra note 7.
13. See infra note 37.
14. See T.R. Goldman, Of Sam Dash's Exit and A Lawyer's Duty, Legal Times,
Nov. 23, 1998, at 14 [hereinafter Goldman, Of Sam Dash's Exit].
15. Walter E. Williams, Hearings: a Sign of Growing National Decadence,
Anchorage Daily News, Dec. 21, 1998, at D9.
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the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct, which provide that "[a]

lawyer shall not intentionally prejudice or damage a client during the
course of the professional relationship,"16 and "[t]he lawyer's
obligation to preserve the client's confidences and secrets continues
after the termination of the lawyer's employment."

7

He then

scathingly concluded that "Dash felt confident that legal ethical
standards have sunk so low that he could damage his client with

impunity."' 8 Another critic, a law school classmate of Dash, claimed
that "[a]s ethics advisers, most giants of American jurisprudence
would be appalled at the ethics of Professor Dash in making public
statements concerning reasons for his resignation."1' 9
Dash responded briefly to an editorial challenging his motives for
resigning, 20 but did not immediately attempt to rebut the criticism of
his decision to publish his letter of resignation. Nevertheless, his
defenders suggested several possible justifications for Dash's conduct,
including an "arrangement with Starr [that] gave Dash the right to
publicly state his disapproval if Starr strayed from his counsel,""1
Dash's right to defend himself against a client who has "effectively
misrepresented the lawyer's advice,"2 and the erosion of the attorneyclient privilege for government lawyers, as reflected in recent legal
rulings that (ironically) Starr himself sought and won during his
investigation of ClintonY3 Indeed, those legal rulings raise the further
question whether Starr himself was ever a client of Dash, or whether
Dash represented the Office of Independent Counsel ("OIC") only,

or perhaps even the "public itself."'2 4
Approximately three months later, Dash finally spoke out publicly,

16. 1d.; see D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3(b) (1999) ("A lawyer
shall not intentionally: (1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of a client through
reasonably available means permitted by law and the disciplinary rules; or (2)
Prejudice or damage a client during the course of the professional relationship.").
17. Williams, supra note 15. See D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(0.
18. See Williams, supra note 15.
19. Harold B. Berman, Sam Erred by Talking, Dallas Morning News, Nov. 29,
1998, at 3J (disagreeing with the Judiciary Committee Democratic staffers' appraisal
of Dash as a "giant of American jurisprudence").
20. See Samuel Dash, Sam Dash Replies, Wash. Post, Nov. 24, 1998, at A18.
21. See Goldman, Of Sam Dash's Exit, supra note 14 (referring, apparently, to the
defense by Professor Monroe Freedman of Hofstra Law School, who is quoted as
saying that "Starr has not only consulted Dash on ethical matters, Starr has used
Dash's name to endorse conduct Starr has engaged in," and further that "if the client
has effectively misrepresented the lawyer's advice, then I think Dash has the right,
and very likely the obligation, to make a public statement"). For a discussion of the
validity of this defense, see infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
22. Goldman, Of Sam Dash's Exit, supra note 14 (quoting Professor Monroe
Freedman from Hofstra Law School).
23. Id (quoting Professor Bruce Green from Fordham Law School). I understand
from Professor Green that, in his discussion with the reporter, he did not in fact offer
this as his personal view, but simply identified a number of arguments, including this
one, that might conceivably be made in defense of Sam Dash's conduct.
24. See infra Part III.
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in a speech given to the members of the Association of Professional
Responsibility Lawyers at the February 1999 mid-year meeting of the
American Bar Association.' Here, Dash first stated that he was not
acting as an "ethics lawyer" for Starr, but rather as an "independent

consultant. 2 6 He was then quoted as saying: "I did not want an
attorney-client relationship with him," because that would involve a
duty of loyalty, and "I wanted no operational role. 2' 7 He did note,

however, that he "was required to maintain confidentiality" of
investigative secrets and grand jury information, which he needed to
know in order to render his advice, "[s]o he took an oath and had this
duty imposed by law. "I
Dash then sought to justify the publication of his resignation as a
form of "noisy withdrawal," explaining that Starr stated "on specific

occasions that he had consulted Dash and that Dash agreed with
him."2 9 According to Dash, this prior publicity, initiated and relied
upon by Starr, created a presumption that Dash approved all of
Starr's decisions. Thus, he said, "[i]t was my right to rebut a
presumption that Starr created by making my role public."30
25. See Ellen J. Bennett, Dash Urges Renewal of Counsel Law, Explains Decision
to Quit as Starr'sAdvisor, 15 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct
47 (1999). Dash also responded to a letter I wrote to him on July 21, 1999, offering
him an opportunity to describe his relationship with Starr for purposes of this Article.
That letter repeats and elaborates upon the statements he made in his February
address at the mid-year meeting of the Association of Professional Responsibility
Lawyers. See Letter from Samuel Dash to Professor Nancy J. Moore (July 28, 1999)
(on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter Dash, Letter].
26. Bennett, supra note 25, at 48. In his subsequent letter to me, Dash stated that
his "actual status was that of a contract consultant, under the same type of contract
the government uses to purchase other kinds of services." Dash, Letter, supra note 25,
at 1.
27. Bennett, supra note 25, at 48. In his letter to me, Dash elaborates as follows:
I insisted from the beginning that I would not serve as Starr's or OIC's
lawyer or have any fiduciary relationship with them. In my view, I could not
be effective as an outside independent consultant if I had a duty of loyalty to
Starr or the office or the responsibilities of an advocate.
Dash, Letter, supra note 25, at 1.
28. See Bennett, supra note 25, at 48.
29. Id.
30. Id. Dash elaborated on this defense at great length in his July 28 letter to me:
There was no doubt in my mind that Starr intended that my role would be
a highly publicized one. He wanted to give the public assurance that, despite
his Republican leanings, he would be professionally objective in the
investigation of a Democratic president, and that he had me, with my
reputation, as a kind of watchdog.
The fact is that he advertized [sic] my involvement widely, and frequently
defended against attacks on his conduct by referring to my favorable review
of the specific issues....
Starr's highly public reliance on my views, was a matter of serious concern
to me from the start. Clearly I expected that Starr would do this for the very
reasons he turned to me in the first place....
While I took aggressive positions within my role, my understanding with
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Under this line of defense, Dash's role as an "independent
consultant" was akin to that of an ethics "expert," a lawyer retained to
provide an independent, objective opinion, rather than zealous
advocacy of a client's position.31 Indeed, Dash's own prior statements
provide indirect support that this was in fact his view at the time he
resigned. Thus, in his November 1998 letter to Starr, Dash said that
he had been hired as outside consultant and adviser to both Starr and
the 01C.32 Admittedly, this statement is itself ambiguous, but it
should be read in conjunction with earlier statements Dash had made
in defense of his $400 an hour fee. 33 Then he was quoted as saying,
"I'm not part-time staff... I'm an outside independent consultant...
and my usual hourly rate when I'm brought in as an expert is $400 an
hour. ''" If Dash was retained as an "expert" and not as an "attorney,"
then arguably his ethical duties were different from those owed by
attorneys to their clients and former clients, 35 although Dash himself
muddies this argument by relying further on his right to make a "noisy
withdrawal."'36
Dash, a professor of law at Georgetown University, frequently
testifies as an ethics expert. 37 In that capacity, ordinarily he would not
form an attorney-client relationship with either the retaining lawyer or
Although Dash was clearly not
the retaining lawyer's client.3
retained by either Starr or the OIC to give testimony, either before a
court or Congress, Dash may well have viewed his role as one of a
neutral "expert" and not that of a partisan attorney. Nevertheless,
even as a "neutral" expert, he probably owed duties of both
Starr was that if the issue was not one of principle or one involving violation
of legal ethics provisions or law, his judgment prevailed, as it should have.
But I informed Starr from the beginning that if we disagreed on issues of
principle, involving the integrity of the investigation, and he would not
follow my advice, I would have to resign and make a public statement
disavowing my support of his planned conduct, without revealing grand jury
material or ongoing secret investigative strategy. I believed I was required
and justified in taking this position for two reasons: (1) Starr's frequent
public announcements of my support for certain actions, [sic] would permit
the public, if I did nothing, to infer I supported what I considered unethical
or unlawful conduct, and (2) I had a separate duty as a lawyer and a
government contract holder to report unlawful or unethical conduct in the
OIC.
Dash, Letter, supra note 25, at 1-2.
31. See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
32. See Van Natta Jr., supra note 7 and accompanying text.
33. Dash's $400 per hour fee prompted considerable criticism. See T.R. Goldman,
How Much Is Too Mucz? Critics Say Starr's Pay Scale for Ethicists Clashes With
Congress' Intent, Legal Times, Nov. 16, 1998, at 1.
34. Id- (emphasis added).
35. See infra notes 41-48.
36. See supra notes 29-30.
37. Thus, Dash sought to justify his $400 an hour fee by noting that this is what he
receives for expert testimony. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
38. See infra note 56.
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confidentiality and loyalty to someone, although those duties may not
have been precisely the same as those owed by more traditional
attorneys.39 Moreover, whether he was an attorney or not, a
government official retained Dash, and thus the identity of the person
(or entity) to whom his duties were owed is by no means clear.40
The purpose of this Article is not to condemn or defend Sam Dash,
but rather to use this highly publicized episode as a jumping-off point
for a discussion of some of the issues involved in the consultation of
lawyers who are experts in ethics and other subject areas. My starting
point is an examination of the distinction between the role of a neutral
expert and that of a partisan attorney. In Part I, I consider when a
lawyer-expert enters into an attorney-client relationship, thus
triggering all of the duties such a relationship ordinarily entails. In
Part II, I consider the nature of the duties owed by an expert who is
not in a traditional attorney-client relationship, specifically whether
such duties differ in important respects from those owed by an
attorney to a client. Finally, in Part III, I consider issues relating to
the identity of the client or other person to whom an expert may owe
duties.
I.

WHEN DOES A LAWYER-EXPERT FORM AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP?

According to a recent opinion by the ABA Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Formal Opinion 97-407, a lawyerexpert may be retained to serve in either of two distinct roles: (1) as a
"testifying expert," or (2) "as a non-testifying 'expert consultant."' 4
The Committee further concluded that whereas the "testifying
expert" does not form an attorney-client relationship and, therefore, is
not necessarily subject to the Model Rules, 42 the non-testifying
"expert consultant" assumes "the role of co-counsel in the matter...
and as such
is subject to all of the Model Rules of Professional
43
Conduct.

If these two roles are exclusive, then Sam Dash must have occupied
the latter (co-counsel consultant) rather than the former (expert
witness), since there was never any expectation that Dash himself
would testify in a formal proceeding. It cannot be the case, however,
that these two categories constitute all of the possible roles for a
consulted lawyer with expertise in a particular subject. For example,
some lawyers retain experts with a view toward determining whether
or not they will testify in a proceeding. If the consulting lawyer
39.
40.
41.
(1997)
42.
43.

See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.A.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-407
[hereinafter Opinion 97-407].
See id.
Id.
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decides not to call the expert, either because the opinion is
unsatisfactory or because the expert would make a poor witness, does
that turn the lawyer-expert into a lawyer-co-counsel? Surely not.
After all, the expert's conduct in both cases is virtually identical-at
least until the point where the consulting lawyer decides either to call
or not to call the lawyer as a witness. It makes no sense to say that
neither the consulting lawyer nor the expert can know whether the
expert has formed an attorney-client relationship until after the
decision whether to call the expert to testify has been made."
Indeed, Opinion 97-407 does not purport to rest on labels, but
rather on a functional analysis of the role performed by the lawyerexpert in each of these two categories. Thus, the expert witness is
described as one who "provide[s] the court, on behalf of the other law
firm and its client, truthful and accurate information."'
Further,
although the testifying expert may render assistance to the consulting
lawyer,' the "duty to advance a client's objectives diligently through
all lawful measures, which is inherent in a client-lawyer relationship, is
inconsistent with the duty47 of a testifying expert," whose views are
"presented as objective."
By contrast, the lawyer-consultant is
someone who is characterized by "protection of client confidences, indepth strategic and tactical involvement in shaping the issues,
assistance in developing facts that are favorable, and zealous partisan
advocacy."' One who performs in that role, regardless of the label
used, implicitly promises the client all the traditional protections
44. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure identify a category of expert witnesses
"who ha[ve] been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of
litigation or preparation for trial and who [are] not expected to be called as a witness
at trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B). The significance of separating these so-called
"consulting experts" from "testifying experts" concerns the ability of the opponent to
discover their identities and opinions. See 8 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2032 (2d ed. 1994). The commentary on non-testifying
experts does not generally distinguish between non-testifying experts who were
initially retained with an expectation that they might testify and those who were never
expected to testify. See id.
45. Opinion 97-407, supra note 41.
46. The Opinion states:
To be sure, the testifying expert may review selected discovery materials,
suggest factual support for his expected testimony and exchange with the law
firm legal authority applicable to his testimony. The testifying expert also
may help the law firm to define potential areas for further inquiry, and he is
expected to present his testimony in the most favorable way to support the
law firms side of the case. He nevertheless is presented as objective and
must provide opinions adverse to the party for whom he expects to testify if
frankness so dictates.
Id.
47. Id
48. Id Expert witnesses are not in a position to protect confidences, since they
are subject to being deposed by the opposing party. See id (citing Fed. R. of Civ. P.
26(a)(2) and 26(b), "which permit broad discovery of testifying experts, but sharply
limit discovery of consulting experts retained to advise in the litigation").
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under the Model Rules, because "[i]n short, a legal consultant acts like
a lawyer representing the client, ratherthan as a witness."4 9

Now, Dash has said that, in his role as ethics consultant to Starr, he
was not acting like a lawyer representing a client5 0 Once again,
however, neither labels nor other verbal characterizations will suffice.
For example, although Dash has disclaimed any "operational role,"5'
various press accounts described him as "play[ing] an active and
influential role in Starr's inquiry into President Clinton's relationship
with Monica Lewinsky, helping to broker an immunity deal with her
in July and assisting in the writing and editing of the impeachment
referral."52
Moreover, as Opinion 97-407 notes, even a testifying expert can
become an expert consultant if the expert becomes involved in
discussions of strategic or tactical issues.53 When this happens, the
result may be the required disclosure of information previously
thought to be confidential.' Additionally, such a blurring of roles
may trigger conflict of interest rules that typically are applicable to
consultants but not to testifying experts. 5
It is possible, however, that the press accounts are wrong and that
Dash did not become actively involved in strategic or tactical
discussions. Of course, if he actually interceded with Monica
Lewinsky's lawyers, brokering an immunity deal on behalf of the OIC,
then it would be difficult for him to maintain that he did not form an
attorney-client relationship with Starr or the OIC. In such a role,
Dash would clearly have been acting more like a lawyer for a client
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
51. Supra note 27 and accompanying text.
52. Van Natta Jr., supra note 7; see Dash, Letter, supra note 25, at 2. In his letter
to me, Dash stated:
I refused to undertake any operational duties in the investigations and

prosecutions to avoid my obtaining a vested interest in Starr's mission, which
could destroy my objectivity and independence. Except for the time I
facilitated Monica Lewinsky's willingness to testify before the grand jury, I
consistently turned down requests by Starr that I become active in the

investigation or that I represent him in certain litigation relating to charges
against him.

Id.

53. See Opinion 97-407, supra note 41. The Opinion also mentions that the lines

can become blurred when the expert becomes privy to "confidential information." Id.

It is unclear what this means: testifying experts are often privy to information that is
confidential in some sense, although there is an understanding that whatever is
disclosed to the expert is subject to formal discovery. See supra note 48.
54. See supra note 48 (discussing how testifying experts are subject to being
deposed by the opposing party).
55. See Opinion 97-407, supra note 41 (discussing differences in conflict of interest
rules as applied to expert consultants and to expert witnesses). For a discussion of
what duty of loyalty a lawyer-consultant who does not form an attorney-client
relationship might owe to either the consulting lawyer or the consulting lawyer's
client, see infra Part II.
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than like a witness. 5 6 The more interesting question, however, is how

the relationship would have been characterized had Dash in fact
limited himself to rendering "objective" opinions or advice on the
ethical propriety of Starr's conduct. After all, this is a role that
lawyers and law professors commonly assume, and it would not be
surprising to learn that in this capacity, lawyer-experts do not always
view themselves as forming an attorney-client relationship.'
For example, a common experience for both law professors and
practicing lawyers is a request for advice by a former student or by an
inexperienced (or less experienced) lawyer. Typically, the request
comes in the form of a brief telephone call, with no expectation that
the lawyer-expert will be formally retained or even paid for the
advice. Moreover, the factual information supplied is usually very
general, perhaps even hypothetical. In some cases, however, the
consultation may take the form of lengthier, more involved
discussions, including the presentation of considerable confidential
information.
These types of "lawyer-to-lawyer consultation" were the subject of
Formal Opinion 98-411 by the ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility. 8 Here, the Committee assumed that the
consulted lawyer is neither a member of the consulting lawyer's firm
nor otherwise formally associated with the matter, and that "there is
no intent to engage the consulted lawyer's services."5 9 The variety of

forms that such a consultation can take were said to range from
"superficial discussions, such as might occur between an audience
member and a continuing legal education ("CLE") speaker, or an
56. Dash says merely that he "facilitated Monica Lewinsky's willingness to testify
before the grand jury." Supra note 52 (quoting Dash's letter to me). It is difficult to
imagine, however, that he did not discuss tactics and strategy with Starr in connection
with his negotiations. For a discussion of the extent to which lawyers can avoid
forming a lawyer-client relationship simply by agreeing with the putative client that
the lawyer is not practicing law, see infra notes 82-83 accompanying text.
Even if we assume that in entering into negotiations with Monica Lewinsky's
lawyers on the OIC's behalf, Dash acted as an attorney for either Starr or the OIC (or
both), this would not necessarily mean that he was acting as an attorney either before
or after the negotiations occurred. See, eg., Heine v. Colton, Hartnick, Yamin &
Sheresky, 786 F. Supp. 360, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that a single legal question
and answer would not create an attorney-client relationship over a long period of time
in which the lawyer otherwise functioned as a business partner).
57. I have discussed this Article with numerous law professors, many of whom
confided that they have performed "consulting work" that they did not believe
constituted the practice of law. In all of these cases, the professors drew the line at
working directly for a client. In their minds, it was the combination of limiting their
work to the giving of expert advice and working only with the retaining lawyer that
permitted them to maintain that they had not formed an attorney-client relationship.
For a discussion of the significance of these factors in determining the existence of an
attorney-client relationship, see infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
58. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 98411 (1998) [hereinafter Opinion 98-411].
59. Id.
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inquiry between colleagues to get a research lead or information
about a particular judge," to "lengthy, detailed discussions '6to obtain
substantial assistance with the analysis or tactics of a matter. "
6
After discussing the ethical issues faced by the consulting lawyer, '
the Committee turned its attention to issues involving the consulted

lawyer. The Committee began by quickly concluding that the
consulted lawyer does not form an attorney-client relationship "by
virtue of the consultation alone."'62 This conclusion is somewhat
surprising.' After all, the Committee expressly included substantial
assistance with the analysis or tactics of a matter among the variety of
forms of lawyer-to-lawyer consultations it described.'
Yet the
Committee had previously concluded in Opinion 97-407 that lawyerexperts who become involved in discussions of strategy or tactics do
enter into an attorney-client relationship.65 Unfortunately, the
Committee did not explain its apparently contradictory conclusion in
Opinion 98-411.
Perhaps the Committee relied on its stated assumption that "there

is no intent to engage the consulted lawyer's services."' The problem,
however, is that in Opinion 97-407, it was clear that the intent of the
parties is not necessarily controlling. There, the Committee had cited
its own previous statement that an attorney-client relationship can
"come into being as a result of reasonable expectations [of the client]
and a failure of the lawyer to dispel these expectations."'67 Moreover,
60. Id.
61. Id. The primary issue discussed in Opinion 98-411 was the duty to avoid
breaching the duty of confidentiality, including the question of whether the client
must give informed consent prior to the consultation. See id. Elsewhere,
commentators on "the ethics of ethics consultation" ask whether the client must be
consulted for other reasons, including the right to control the manner in which the
representation proceeds and the right to be consulted prior to the association of
separate counsel. See, e.g., Pizzimenti, supra note 1, at 21 (discussing the applicability
of Model Rule 1.2 on the allocation of decision-making between lawyer and client and
the applicability of Model Rule 1.5(e) on the division of fees between lawyers not in
the same firm).
62. Opinion 98-411, supra note 58.
63. See, e.g., Chinaris, supra note 1, at 47 (assuming, without explanation, that an
attorney-client relationship is formed when one lawyer consults another lawyer for
purposes of determining the ethical propriety of the lawyer's conduct and the primary
purpose of the consultation is to benefit the lawyer himself, not the lawyer's client).
64. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
66. Opinion 98-411, supra note 58.
67. Opinion 97-407, supra note 41. But see Davis v. York Int'l Corp., No. CIV.A.
HAR 92-3545, 1993 WL 180224, at *2 (D. Md. May 24, 1993) (rejecting a reasonable
expectations test in favor of a requirement of a "mutual understanding giving rise to
an attorney-client relationship" in a case where an audience member briefly consulted
a CLE instructor after a lecture and the court held that no duty of confidentiality gave
rise to a disqualification of the instructor or the firm). For a more extended
discussion of the "reasonable expectations" test as a basis for finding an attorneyclient relationship, see Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties of Attorneys to "NonClients": Reconceptualizing the Attorney-Client Relationship in Entity Representation
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the Committee concluded that even when there is a written agreement
that a testifying expert will not perform as co-counsel, any blurring of
the roles in actual practice may cause an attorney-client relationship
to be formed, despite the contrary intentions of the parties. 63 Further,
the Committee had foreseen that the primary way in which the roles
would become blurred was for a testifying expert to become involved
in discussion of tactical or strategic issues of the case, or become privy
to confidential information pertaining to the case. 69
Nor could the Committee that drafted Opinion 98-411 have relied
on the assumption that the consultation did not involve any expected
remuneration. After all, it is well-settled that the absence of a fee is
70
not determinative of the presence of an attorney-client relationship,
although it may be a factor to be considered along with the other
relevant circumstances. 71 Of course, testifying experts typically do
expect to be paid for their services, yet the fact of remuneration alone
obviously does not transform the testifying expert into co-counsel.
Then what is the key to determining when a non-testifying lawyerexpert-consultant enters into an attorney-client relationship?
Although the fact of remuneration is not itself determinative, it may
be helpful first to consider the status of casual consultations for which
the expert will not be paid, and then turn to more formal retainer
arrangements such as the arrangement between Sam Dash and Ken
Starr.
With respect to the former, the more significant factor may be the
informality of the consultation, rather than the absence of
remuneration. After all, when the consultation is brief and does not
involve the sharing of detailed, factual information, it is unlikely that
the recipient will act in reliance on the expert's advice. n Moreover, in
the analogous context of physicians consulting physicians, courts have
recognized a public policy in favor of furthering the development of
mentoring relationships between professional colleagues. Thus, like
and Other Inherently Ambiguous Situations, 45 S.C. L Rev. 659, 679-87 (1994)
[hereinafter Moore, Expanding Duties of Attorneys]; Note, An Expectations
Approach to Client Identity, 106 Harv. L Rev. 687 (1993).

6& See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., 1 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 8.3, at

569 (4th ed. 1996) ("The creation of the [attorney-client] relationship does not require
the payment of a fee.").

71. See id § 8.3, at 570.
72. Cf.Gilinsky v. Indelicato, 894 F. Supp. 86, 92-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). The issue

before the Gilinsky court was whether a physician-patient relationship came into
being when a treating physician consulted an expert-mentor. See id The court held
that because the consultation was not "fleeting and informal," but rather was

"continuous, and substantial," it was foreseeable that the treating physician would
rely on the expert-mentor's advice. Id. at 93.

73. See Hill v.Kokosky, 186 Mich. App. 300, 306 (1990). The court in Hill stated:
"The extension of potential malpractice liability to doctors with whom a treating

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

the consulted physician, perhaps the consulted lawyer should be
treated as source material such as a treatise or a textbook, or as one
who simply contributes to the body of information available to the
consulting lawyer who is representing a client.7 4
As the consulted lawyer becomes more heavily involved, however,
it is increasingly foreseeable that the consulting lawyer will rely on the
expert's advice, for the benefit of the consulting lawyer's client (or the
lawyer herself).'
At the same time, the policy favoring the
furtherance of informal, mentoring relationships among professional
colleagues may give way to other policy considerations, including
protecting the reasonable expectations of the client (or the lawyeragent acting on the client's behalf or the consulting lawyer herself)7 6
regarding such matters as loyalty, confidentiality, and competence.77
At some point, the involvement of the expert will become such that
the consulted lawyer will be transformed from a treatise or a textbook
into a lawyer providing legal services to a client.7" In these cases there
will be no bright lines, but rather only various factors to be considered
in determining when a particular consultation gives rise to an
attorney-client relationship. Such factors may include the length of
the consultation, the amount of detailed, factual information the
expert is provided, and the foreseeability that the consulting lawyer
will rely on the advice given by the expert. 9
What then of more formal arrangements-such as the one between
physician has merely conferred, without more, would unacceptably inhibit the
exchange of information and expertise among physicians. This would benefit neither
those seeking medical attention nor the medical profession." Id.; see also Gilinsky,
894 F. Supp. at 91 ("Consultations between professionals facilitate the free flow of
information between colleagues and inure to the benefit of the professional and the
patient."). In the context of lawyers consulting other lawyers, see Chinaris, supra
note 1, at 51 ("It is sound public policy to encourage ethics consultations. Imposing
upon a consulted lawyer fiduciary duties to the consulting lawyer's client would have
the opposite effect."). Chinaris draws this conclusion in the context of client-driven
consultations. When a consultation is lawyer-driven, he assumes the existence of a
lawyer-client relationship, even in the absence of a fee. See id. He gives no
explanation, however, why public policy is not equally important in a lawyer-driven
consultation.
74. See Gilinsky, 894 F. Supp. at 91 (referring to the Hill decision).
75. See id. at 91-93 (holding that given the nature of the consultation between
physicians, which consisted of seven telephone calls lasting approximately 38 minutes,
as well as a mentoring relationship between physicians, a jury could find that the
consulted physician, under conditions of emergency, should have realized that the
treating physician would rely on his advice "and perform the exact procedures that
[the consulted physician] instructed").
76. See infra Part III.
77. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
78. See Hill, 186 Mich. App. at 305 (considering the question to be whether
consulted physicians "were providing medical treatment when they talked with [the
consulting physician]").
79. See Gilinsky, 894 F. Supp. at 91 (describing factors that courts take into
account in determining when a casual consultation between physicians gives rise to a
physician-patient relationship).
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Sam Dash and Ken Starr-which include the payment of a substantial
fee? 80 Under these circumstances, there can be no question that the
lawyer-expert is providing services, for which the expert must be
accountable in some respect."1 But is the accountability necessarily
one of a lawyer to a client? Keep in mind that the formation of an
attorney-client relationship has traditionally been viewed as a matter
of contract law, and that the "reasonable expectations" test evolved in
situations of ambiguity, where a lawyer failed to clarify her role in a
matter.82 If Sam Dash wants to say that he is not being retained as a
lawyer but as a mere "expert" or "consultant," and Ken Starr (himself
a lawyer) agrees,83 is there any reason not to give effect to such an
agreement?
Consider a law professor who receives a telephone call from a
lawyer representing a client. The lawyer wants to retain the professor
to give the lawyer legal advice, for the benefit of either the lawyer
herself or the lawyer's client, and offers to pay the professor a
substantial fee. The professor, however, explains that he is not
admitted to practice law in that jurisdiction (or perhaps he is not
admitted to practice in any jurisdiction),' In addition, the professor
has no legal malpractice insurance. As a result, the professor asks
whether it is possible to structure the relationship so that the professor
will not be forming an attorney-client relationship. The lawyer and the
professor then agree, in writing, that the professor will not be acting as
a lawyer, but rather is being retained solely as an "expert" or
"consultant." Is such an agreement valid?
Surely the answer must depend, in whole or in part, on the nature of
the services to be rendered. If the professor is (or may be) a testifying
expert, then the agreement is clearly proper, because the act of
testifying, even as to a legal opinion, is not itself a legal service, nor is
the preliminary consultation typically performed by the testifying
If, however, the professor will write a brief, make an
expert
80. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing news accounts of Dash's
contract rate of $400 per hour).
81. Indeed, Dash describes his relationship with Starr as contractual in nature. See
Dash, Letter, supra note 25, at 1 ("My actual status was that of a contract consultant,
under the same type of contract the government uses to purchase other kinds of
services.").
82. See Moore, ExpandingDuties of Attorneys, supra note 67, at 679-87.

83. See Dash, Letter, supra note 25, at 1 ("I insisted from the beginning that I
would not serve as Starr's or OIC's lawyer or have any fiduciary relationship with
them.").

84. Under state law, unauthorized practice of law doctrine applies both to nonlawyers (including law graduates not admitted to the bar in any jurisdiction) and to
lawyers admitted in one jurisdiction who practice law in another jurisdiction in which
the lawyer is not admitted. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 15.1, at
824 (1986); see also Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.5 (1998) ("A lawyer
shall not... practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates regulation of the
legal profession in that jurisdiction.").
85. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
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appellate argument, or draft a legal instrument, then the purpose of

such an agreement can only be to evade unauthorized practice laws
and potential malpractice claims. 86 These types of agreements
contravene public policy and should be given no effect. 7
Thus, it would appear that the first question to ask in these cases is
whether the services provided are legal services or whether they can
be characterized properly as non-legal in nature.' This is not always
an easy question to answer, as anyone will attest who has tried to
define what constitutes the "practice of law, 8 9 particularly when the
issue involves the conduct of lawyers themselves.' Nevertheless, a
contract to advise on the lawfulness of a proposed course of conduct

would appear to fall squarely within the legal services category. 9'
86. While there is considerable disagreement over any comprehensive definition
of what constitutes the practice of law, it is generally agreed that such practice
includes the representation of another person in litigation. See Restatement (Third)
of the Law Governing Lawyers § 4 cmt. c (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1998);
Wolfram, supra note 84, § 15.1.3, at 834. Such representation clearly includes a
personal appearance before the court at trial or on appeal, and should also include
drafting of a brief, which is an argument made to a court, only in written form. The
drafting of legal instruments is also generally considered to constitute the practice of
law, except perhaps where incidental to another specialized occupation, particularly
when the preparation involves the filling in of blanks in a standard form. See id.; see
also D.C. App. R. 49(b)(2)(A) (1999) (describing the practice of law as
"[p]reparing... deeds, mortgages, assignments, discharges, leases, [and] trust
instruments").
Performing legal services under the supervision of an admitted lawyer may not
constitute the unauthorized practice of law, but this is rarely what lawyer-experts are
asked or expected to do. See infra note 88.
87. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(h) (1998) (prohibiting a
lawyer from making an agreement "prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a
client for malpractice"). Aside from the potential harm to clients, the rationale for
limiting the practice of law to lawyers licensed in the jurisdiction includes providing "a
basis for imposing lawyer discipline and other regulation." Wolfram, supra note 84, §
15.1.2, at 833.
88. The consulted lawyer might argue that even performing legal services is not
improper if done under the supervision of an admitted lawyer, such as the consulting
lawyer. There are two flaws in this argument. First, experts are consulted precisely
because the consulting lawyer does not have the requisite expertise; thus, the
consulting lawyer is in no position to supervise the competence of the work
performed. Secondly, non-lawyers acting under the supervision of a lawyer must be
closely supervised. See Wolfram, supra note 84, § 15.1.4, at 847. Most professors and
other lawyer-experts do not expect to work under such conditions.
89. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 4 cmt. c (Proposed
Final Draft No. 2, 1998); Wolfram, supra note 84, § 15.1.3, at 835-44.
90. See ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of
Delegates app. C, at C7 (Aug. 1999) (Reporter's Notes) (discussing the difficulty of
defining the practice of law in the context of lawyers employed by accounting firms
and other non-lawyer entities). The Commission's proposed definition of the practice
of law, which is based on the Washington, D.C. court rules, has been criticized as far
too broad. See id. at C14; Lora Weber, Shaping the Future of Law: ABA's
Multidisciplinary Practice Proposals Will Stymie the Growth of MDPS-Consumers
Not Helped, Legal Times, Aug. 2, 1999, at 27.
91. Such advice would appear to be clearly within each of the most frequently
used tests for determining what constitutes the practice of law: "the professional
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After all, lawyers are not merely partisan advocates, and the

rendering of legal advice, even "objective" (or "candid") advice, is
precisely the role of the lawyer as counselor, a role92 now formally
recognized in the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct.
If, as in the case of Dash and Starr, the advice is given directly to
the "client,"' then the conclusion seems clear that the professor's
advice is legal advice and the professor is practicing law. But what if

the professor's opinion is given to a consulting lawyer, who will
exercise "independent judgment" in determining how to use that
opinion in advising the ultimate client? 94 Does public policy still
judgment test, the traditional areas of law practice test, and the incidental legal
services test." Wolfram, supra note 84, § 15.1.2, at 836. Such advice involves an
activity "in which a lawyer's presumed special training and skills are relevant," an
activity that is something lawyers commonly do, and an activity that is not "simply an
adjunct to a routine in the business or commercial world that is not itself law
practice." Id.
92- See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.1 (1998) ("In representing a
client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid
advice."); Wolfram, supra note 84, § 13.3 (discussing how lawyers advise clients).
93. According to Dash, Starr had an "official staff ethics officer" who consulted
Dash, and while the ethics officer's opinion was "official," Dash's was merely
"advisory." Dash, Letter, supra note 25, at 2. Nevertheless, it appears that Dash
counseled Starr directly on numerous occasions. Moreover, Dash "informed Starr
from the beginning that if [they] disagreed on issues of principle, involving the
integrity of the investigation, and he would not follow [Dash's] advice, [Dash] would
have to resign and make a public statement disavowing [Dash's] support of his
planned conduct." Id. Advice, coupled with a threat to resign and make public
statements if the advice was not followed, hardly constitutes a merely "advisory"
opinion. In any event, if the OIC, rather than Starr individually, was the putative
"client," see infra Part III, then Dash's advice was given directly to the client.
Unquestionably, the fact that legal advice is given directly to a client is an
important factor in determining whether particular conduct constitutes the practice of
law. See D.C. App. R. 49(b)(2) (1999) ("'Practice of Law' means the provision of
professional legal advice or services where there is a client relationship of trust or
reliance."); see also supra note 72 and accompanying text (finding that in medical
cases, the courts are less likely to find that physician-patient relationships have been
formed in brief, informal consultations between physicians, where the consulted
physician does not meet the patient). But see infra Part IIl (discussing how the
consulting lawyer may be an agent of the client and how that agent may rely on the
client's behalf).
94. In cases involving informal consultations between physicians, whether it is
foreseeable that the treating physician will not render independent judgment and will
rely on the consulted physician, is a significant factor in determining if a physicianpatient relationship has been formed. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
The question here is whether the fact that the consultation is not informal, but rather
involves a formal retainer arrangement, should also have a bearing in determining
whether a professional relationship has been formed with the ultimate client/patient
for whose benefit the arrangement has been made. The question also arises of what
constitutes "independent" judgment on the part of the treating professional. To the
extent that the lawyer-expert's opinions go beyond abstract statements of what the
law is and apply a body of law to the facts of a particular case, it is obviously more
likely that the expert will be deemed to be practicing law. Given that the lawyerexpert is consulted precisely because the consulting lawyer does not have the requisite
expertise, it is difficult to understand how the consulting lawyer will exercise
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demand that the professor be deemed to have entered into an

attorney-client relationship?

I believe that there are many law

professors who do precisely this kind of consulting and who believe in
good faith that they are not practicing law. Nevertheless, there is
reason to question whether courts will ultimately validate these
arrangements. At the very least, law professors and other consulted
lawyers must understand and ensure that the consulting lawyer
understands whether, and to what extent, absence of an attorneyclient relationship has an adverse effect on the confidentiality interests
of the consulting lawyer's client.9 5 If it is true that information relating
to the representation of the client will not be protected as fully under
the "expert-consultant" model,96 then this fact alone should give
lawyers pause before attempting to negotiate their way out of an
attorney-client relationship.
There is, perhaps, one final alternative to consider in evaluating
whether Sam Dash performed as a lawyer or in some non-lawyer role.
What if Dash's primary role was to publicize his candid opinion of the
propriety of Starr's conduct? 97 If, for example, his opinion was
rendered only after Starr had acted, then wouldn't his role be very
close to the testifying expert's? Why should it matter that his opinion
was not given under oath in a formal proceeding? 98 This is an
important question, because a lawyer or law professor might well be
retained in other circumstances to render an objective opinion to
some third person. If an opinion is not designed to be acted upon by
the client, but rather to be presented by a client to some third person,
then arguably the rendering of the opinion, even a legal one, might
not be characterized as performing legal services. 99
"independent" judgment, unless the consulting lawyer is planning to read for herself
the underlying source material that constitutes the basis of the expert's opinion.
95. See Tellam, supra note 1, at 55-56 (discussing the duty of a consulted lawyer to
ensure that the consulting lawyer is aware of the risk to the latter, due to failure to
establish an attorney-client relationship, and consequent need to establish
affirmatively another type of confidential relationship); see also infra Part II
(discussing the obligation of confidentiality of a lawyer-expert who has not formed an
attorney-client relationship, including a comparison with obligations of an attorney
representing a client).
96. See infra Part II.
97. This was apparently not the case. Although Dash says he fully expected that
Starr would publicize Dash's role when he had approved Starr's conduct, this was not
the purpose for which his advice was given. Indeed, Dash's concern was that Starr
follow his advice, particularly when the matter involved an important principle or
violation of ethics rules or other law. See Dash, Letter, supra note 25, at 2 (discussing
how Dash threatened to resign if Starr did not follow his advice on important issues).
98. Expert opinions are commonly rendered in the form of a written report, which
is provided to the opposing party and may form the basis for a deposition. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). Cases are often settled on the basis of these reports, without
testimony being given under oath either at trial or at a deposition.
99. Arguably, the mere rendering of such an opinion without more, is
distinguishable from the type of evaluation for use by third persons that is viewed by
lawyer disciplinary codes as yet another form of legal services provided by lawyers.
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II. WHAT DuTIES ARE OWED BY A LAWYER-EXPERTCONSULTANT WHO DOES NOT FORM AN ATtORNEY-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP?
If Sam Dash formed an attorney-client relationship with Ken Starr
(or the OIC, or both'00), then clearly he owed his client(s) duties of
competence, 0 1 loyalty, 102 and confidentiality.yu3 In this event, Dash
would almost certainly continue to argue that the publication of his

resignation letter was justified, perhaps by claiming that Starr
consented to the disclosure of otherwise confidential information.' 0 '

See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.3 (1998).
Rule 2.3. entitled
"Evaluation for Use by Third Persons," provides:
(a) A lawyer may undertake an evaluation of a matter affecting a client for
the use of someone other than the client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is
compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's relationship with the
client; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
(b) Except as disclosure is required in connection with a report of an
evaluation, information... is otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
Id Under Rule 23, it is apparently contemplated that the lawyer making the
evaluation already represents the client, and is thus responsible for determining that
making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's relationship
with the client, and that the client consents after consultation. Thus, if a consulting
lawyer requested another lawyer to render the evaluation, the consulted lawyer would

not necessarily be governed by that rule. In my hypothetical, Dash would not be
responsible for determining if publicizing the opinion was in fact in Ken Starr's best
interest. If he was responsible for doing so, then he would be rendering legal services
as contemplated by Rule 2.3.
100. For a discussion of the difficulties of client identification in the entityconstituent context, see infra Part III.
101. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1; Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers § 28 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996). Aside from
possible disciplinary a'ction, this duty is enforceable through a legal malpractice
lawsuit. See id §§ 71, 72 (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1994).
102. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.7-1.10 (discussing current,
successive, and imputed conflicts of interest); Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers § 201 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (discussing conflicts of
interest). Aside from possible disciplinary action, these duties are enforceable
through such remedies as disqualification, legal malpractice, fee forfeiture, and
sometimes even criminal sanctions. See id. cmt. f; see also id. § 207 cmt. a (discussing
how business transactions between lawyers and clients create the risk that the
transaction will be voidable by the client).
103. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.6, 1.9 (1998); Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers ch. 5 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996)
(discussing confidential client information). Aside from disciplinary action, these
duties are enforceable through an action to recover damages for negligent or
intentional breach, and possibly such additional remedies as exclusion or suppression
of a lawyer's attempted testimony, protection of lawyer work-product, and remedies
relating to conflict of interest. See id. § 112 cmt. a.
104. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Even absent an express or implied
agreement by Starr to permit Dash's disclosure in this instance, the suggestion has
been made that when a client "has effectively misrepresented the lawyer's advice,"
the lawyer "has the right.., to make a public statement" correcting the record.
Goldman, Of Sam Dash's Exit, supra note 14 (quoting Professor Monroe Freedman).
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Such a claim, however, would be problematic. For example, it does
not appear that Starr expressly authorized Dash to make his
resignation letter public. 5 Nor is it clear that Starr's prior publication
of Dash's approving opinions constituted implied consent for Dash's
publication of a contrary opinion, or even that such "implied" consent
16
would have been sufficient to authorize such a harmful disclosure. 0
Moreover, even if Dash was expressly or impliedly authorized to
make public both his resignation and his disapproval of Starr's
voluntary appearance before Congress, it would still be hard to justify
the harsh language of Dash's letter, including his characterization of
Starr's conduct as "unlawful." 107
Although this proposition is intuitively appealing, there is no clear authority for it in
lawyer disciplinary codes. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(b)(2)
(describing the so-called self-defense provision, which is limited to establishing a
claim or a defense in a controversy between a lawyer and a client, establishing a
defense to a criminal charge or civil claim, or responding to allegations in a
proceeding concerning a lawyer's representation of a client).
105. In his letter of resignation, Dash clearly implied that he had no express
consent to publish either the fact of his resignation or the reasons therefore, stating
only an implied right on his part to rebut an inference that he had approved Starr's
conduct: "Frequently you have publicly stated that you have sought my advice in
major decisions and had my approval. I cannot allow that inference to continue
regarding your present abuse of your office and have no other choice but to resign."
Van Natta Jr., supra note 7 (quoting resignation letter from Dash to Starr). When
Dash spoke out several months later and specifically addressed the propriety of his
publishing the resignation letter, once again he did not mention any express
agreement, but rather described the letter as a form of "'noisy' withdrawal, explaining
that Starr chose to rely publicly on Dash's advice by stating on specific occasions that
he had consulted Dash and that Dash agreed with him," thus creating "a presumption
that Dash approved Starr's decisions unless Dash rebutted them." Bennett, supra
note 25, at 48. It is only recently, in his letter to me, that Dash says that he "informed
Starr from the beginning that if [they] disagreed on issues of principle, involving the
integrity of the investigation, and he would not follow [Dash's] advice, [Dash] would
have to resign and make a public statement disavowing [his] support of his planned
conduct." Dash, Letter, supra note 25, at 2. Of course, even this statement does not
clearly indicate that Starr expressly agreed to publication not only of Dash's
disapproval, but also of the reasons for that disapproval.
106. With respect to client consent, Model Rule 1.6(a) states that the client must
consent "after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6
(a). Here, it is clear that the disclosure was not "impliedly authorized in order to
carry out the representation," since the disclosure was in fact a resignation. Nor is
there implied consent in the sense that one could assume that Starr would have
consented if he had been asked. It is at least possible, although not likely, that Starr
would have granted such consent, given his close relationship with Dash. For
example, whereas Starr's aides reacted angrily to the publication of the resignation
letter, see supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text, Starr himself apparently did not.
See John C. Henry, Hous. Chronicle, Ex-Watergate Counsel Quits as Starr AidTestifying to Panel Chided, Nov. 21, 1998, at 1 (quoting Starr as characterizing Dash's
resignation as merely "a gentle disagreement," without apparently even commenting
on the publication of the resignation letter).
107. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Professor Stephen Gillers, a legal
ethics expert from New York University School of Law, characterized the language in
the Dash resignation letter as "extraordinarily harsh." Goldman, Of Sam Dash's Exit,
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Perhaps recognizing the difficulty of establishing a defense within
the confines of an attorney-client relationship, Dash takes great pains
to persuade us that he had no such relationship with either Starr or
the OIC.1 s Indeed, he flatly stated that his primary purpose in
disclaiming an attorney-client relationship was to avoid assuming
fiduciary duties, such as confidentiality and loyalty, so that he could be
truly "independent."'' 1 9 As discussed in Part I, whether a lawyerexpert-consultant forms an attorney-client relationship might depend
on whether the consultant renders legal advice directly to a putative
client, rather than through a consulting lawyer who will then exercise
independent judgment on behalf of the consulting lawyer's client.110
In my opinion, because Dash's relationship with Starr and the OIC
appears to have been direct, in all likelihood it would be found that he
did form an attorney-client relationship with one or both. Even if he
had worked through a consulting lawyer, however, and it was
determined that no attorney-client relationship was formed,"' it is
unlikely that he would have succeeded in avoiding the assumption of
any duties to the retaining lawyer's client. Indeed, except for
purposes of unauthorized practice of law statutes," 2 it may not even
matter whether an attorney-client relationship was formed, because
the duties owed even outside such a relationship may be substantially
similar to those owed when such a relationship actually exists.
Let me quickly concede that I am not talking about informal,
gratuitous consultations, pertaining to ethics or otherwise. I think it is
fairly clear that so long as the consulting lawyer keeps the consultation
brief and avoids disclosing specific, detailed information, no attorneyclient relationship will result, and the consulted lawyer will have
assumed no duties of competence, loyalty, or confidentiality. 1 3 The
more troublesome cases, however, are those in which the relationship
is more formal, particularly when the consulted lawyer or law
professor will be paid for her services. I argued in Part I that it may
be impossible to structure the relationship to avoid a subsequent
finding that an attorney-client relationship was formed. In this part,
however, I argue that even if a court were to agree that the consulted
Dash had to
supra note 14. Professor Gillers was also quoted as saying that "[ijf
resign, he should have just said he had to resign." IL
108. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. Even when the relationship is
indirect and conducted solely through a consulting lawyer, there is reason to believe
that a lawyer who provides legal services for the benefit of the consulting lawyer's
client has formed an attorney-client relationship with that client, albeit inadvertently.
See infra Part III.
111. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (arguing that the provision of
legal services, even through a retaining attorney, may constitute the establishment of
an attorney-client relationship).
112. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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lawyer had no attorney-client relationship, the duties owed by such a
lawyer to the consulting lawyer's client would be substantially similar
to those arising from an attorney-client relationship." 4
Consider, for example, the status of an economist hired not to
testify, but rather to render advice that will help the consulting lawyer
better represent that lawyer's client." 5 Such an economist may be an
independent contractor,11 6 but she is also an agent, because she is
retained to act on behalf of, and subject to, the control of the
8 and has duties to
consulting lawyer.11 7 As an agent, she is a fiduciary"
11 9 loyalty, 20 and confidentiality. 21
her principal of competence,
Moreover, as a "subagent,"'2 her duties are owed not only to the
114. My thanks to my colleague Professor Susan Koniak for pointing me in this
direction.
115. It is clear, for example, that Rule 26 contemplates the use by a party of "an
expert who has been retained or specially employed ... in anticipation of litigation or
preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B). See Wright et al., supra note 44, § 2032.
116. According to the Restatement of Agency, "[a]n independent contractor is a
person who contracts with another to do something for him but who is not controlled
by the other nor subject to the other's right to control with respect to his physical
conduct in the performance of the undertaking." Restatement (Second) of Agency §
2(3) (1958). An independent contractor is distinguished from a "servant," who is an
"agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose physical conduct
in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to control by
the master." Id. § 2(2). Servants are by definition agents, whereas independent
contractors may or may not be agents. See id. § 2(3).
117. The Restatement (Second) of Agency section 1 defines agency and principal
as follows:
(1) Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of
consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and
subject to his control, and consent by the other to so act.
(2) The one for whom action is to be taken is the principal.
(3) The one who is to act is the agent.
Id. § 1.
"Control" does not mean "physical control," which is merely the means of
distinguishing independent contractors from servants. See supra note 116.
Independent contractors may or may not be agents. See supra note 116. Consultants
are ordinarily subject to the control of the consulting lawyer, who typically specifies
the form in which the consultant's advice will be rendered and has the ability to limit
the total number of hours and the types of expenses that will be reimbursed.
118. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 13 (1958) ("An agent is a fiduciary
with respect to matters within the scope of his agency.").
119. See id. § 379 (describing the duty of care and skill).
120. See id. §§ 387-398.
121. See id. §§ 395-396 (describing the duties of confidentiality, which are
characterized as an aspect of the agent's duty of loyalty).
122. A subagent is "a person appointed by an agent empowered to do so, to
perform functions undertaken by the agent for the principal, but for whose conduct
the agent agrees with the principal to be primarily responsible." Id. § 5(1). While the
consulting attorney may have no actual authority to associate another lawyer to
represent the client, i.e., in an attorney-client relationship, see infra note 184 and
accompanying text, the consulting lawyer clearly has the authority to retain both
testifying and non-testifying experts and consultants. See Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers § 32(3) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (providing that
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consulting lawyer-agent, but also to the consulting lawyer's client: the
ultimate principal. 123
Of course, the duties of a non-lawyer agent are not co-extensive
with the duties owed by a lawyer to a client. An agent is subject to a
duty of loyalty not to act adversely to the principal in matters
connected with the agency. Unlike a lawyer-agent, however, a nonlawyer agent has no duty to refuse engagements that pose the mere
potential for conflict of interest.124 Similarly, an agent is subject to a
duty of confidentiality,' 2 but unlike a lawyer-agent, the scope of the
duty owed by a non-lawyer agent is limited to confidential
information and only prohibits use that is actually harmful to the
principal."2 Nevertheless, the duties of a non-lawyer agent are
substantial and place severe constraints on the economist-expertconsultant, and therefore on the lawyer-expert-consultant, even when
no attorney-client relationship has been formed.
Indeed, these fiduciary duties have been recognized and protected
by courts in several situations. For example, although some ethics
commentators have expressed concern regarding the difficulty of
establishing a "confidential relationship" between consulting and
consulted lawyers,'27 courts routinely hold that the attorney-client
absent a prior agreement or client's instructions to the contrary, "a lawyer may take
any lawful measure within the scope of representation that is reasonably calculated to
advance a client's objectives as defined by the client").
123. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 428 (1958).
124. Compare Restatement (Second) of Agency § 387 (providing that the agent has
a duty to "act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his
agency"), with Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(b) (1998) (providing
that a lawyer is prohibited from representing a client "if the representation of that
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to
a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless" the client consents after
consultation and "the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected" (emphasis added)).
125. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
126. Compare Restatement (Second) of Agency § 395 (defining the duty "not to
use or to communicate information confidentially given him by the principal or
acquired by him during the course of or on account of his agency"), with Model Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(a) (describing the duty not to disclose any and all
"information relating to representation"); compare Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 395 (describing a duty not to disclose or use information "in competition with or to
the injury of the principal"), with Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(a),
1.8(b) (providing that no disclosure or use is permitted without the client's consent).
For a discussion of whether communications to a lawyer-expert-consultant are
protected by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, see infra notes 127-29 and
accompanying text.
127. See Chinaris,supra note 1, at 49-52 (proposing an amendment to Rule 1.6 that
would permit a lawyer to consult with a non-affiliated lawyer about a "bona fide
ethical dilemma," in response to concerns regarding the lack of confidentiality
obligations of the consulted lawyer who does not form an attorney-client relationship
with the consulting lawyer). Part of the difficulty of ethics consultations is that the
consulting lawyer may be looking for advice that would be helpful to the lawyer
herself and disadvantageous to the client. See id. Thus, it may be difficult to argue
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evidentiary privilege extends to agents of the lawyer who assist the
lawyer in providing legal services to the client. 12
Given this
protection, consulting lawyers must be impliedly authorized to
communicate confidential client information to consulted experts,
including both the non-lawyer economist (or accountant or physician)
and the lawyer-consultant,1 2 9 reasonably expecting that such
communications will be immune from discovery, so long as the expert
is not expected to testify. 130 Moreover, through the vehicle of
disqualification orders, courts have recognized even a non-lawyer
31
expert's duty of confidentiality to a consulting lawyer's client.
Although courts do not apply the same presumptions that apply to a
former representing-lawyer or law firm, they will disqualify the expert

from consulting or testifying for the former client's adversary, when

they are persuaded that the consulting lawyer acted reasonably in
assuming that a confidential or fiduciary relationship existed with the
expert, and that the consulting lawyer disclosed confidential client
information to the expert.
Moreover, although they have not
that the disclosure of confidential client information to the consulted lawyer is
impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6. See id.
128. See Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 F.R.D. 575, 580 (D.N.J. 1994); 3 Jack
B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 503.12[3][a], [b]
(Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1999) (providing that "[t]he privilege protects
communications to attorney's staff and to consultants and other agents employed in
rendering legal services").
129. With ethics experts, this argument may not work when the consultation is
made not for the purpose of furthering the client's interests, but rather for the
purpose of furthering the consulting lawyer's own interests in the representation. See
supra note 127 and accompanying text.
130. For a discussion of the limitations on confidentiality for testifying experts, see
supra note 47 and accompanying text.
131. See Cordy, 156 F.R.D. at 580; Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. Division of Bldg. &
Constr., 170 N.J. Super. 64,71-72 (Law Div. 1979).
132. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 734 F. Supp.
334, 339 (N.D. Ill. 1990). In Great Lakes, a case involving the disqualification of an
expert, the court declined to adopt the presumption applied in cases involving former
attorneys, i.e., that "once a confidential relationship is established, it is presumed that
confidential communications were made and such communications will be used to the
detriment of the communicating party." Id. at 338. Accordingly, the court held that
disqualification of a former expert requires the moving party to establish that the
expert in fact received confidential client information. See id. at 338-39; see also
Cordy, 156 F.R.D. at 580 (distinguishing between experts and attorneys and requiring
that there be proof that confidences were imparted to a former expert before the
court will order disqualification). At least one court has distinguished an attorneyexpert from non-attorney-experts, holding that the attorney-expert may be
disqualified by use of a test similar to that applied to attorneys, in a case where the
moving party alleged the existence of an attorney-client relationship. See W.R. Grace
& Co. v. Gracecare, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 61, 64-65 (D. Md. 1993) (discussing how a
consulting lawyer testified that he believed an attorney-client relationship was created
between his client and a practicing trademark attorney he consulted to advise his
client on several issues in the lawsuit, including the appropriateness of expert
testimony). A second presumption that applies in disqualification cases involving
former attorneys but not disqualification cases involving former experts is the
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explained in detail the basis for finding a confidential or fiduciary

relationship with an expert, courts routinely find such a relationship
exists, even absent an express confidentiality agreement.133
What about a lawyer-consultant's fear of a malpractice or breach of
fiduciary duty lawsuit brought by the consulting lawyer's client?
Although I have not found any cases directly on point, it would
appear that such lawsuits would be relatively straightforward, given
the expert's status as both agent of the consulting lawyer and subagent
of the consulting lawyer's client. According to the Restatement
(Second) of Agency, a "subagent who knows of the existence of the
ultimate principal owes him the duties owed by an agent to a
principal, except the duties dependent upon the existence of a
contract."' 1" Thus, although it is true that the subagent is not liable to
the principal for mere failure to perform under the contract with the
agent, the subagent is liable to the principal for breaches of fiduciary
duties (including disclosure of confidential information) and for losses
suffered because of reliance upon performance by the principal or
agent, including an action in tort for damages due to negligent
performance. 35 Such liability could also be based on a finding that the
consulting lawyer's client is the third-party beneficiary of the contract
between the consulting lawyer and the lawyer-expert-consultant." z
presumption that an attorney has shared confidential information with the attorney's
partners. See Great Lakes, 734 F. Supp. at 336-38 (refusing to disqualify partner of
plaintiffs former expert and distinguishing cases involving former attorneys).
133. See Cordy, 156 F.RD. at 581 (finding that the absence of a confidentiality
agreement is not determinative and the question is "whether [the consulting lawyer]
acted reasonably in assuming that a confidential or fiduciary relationship existed with
[the expert]"). Apparently courts are willing to presume a relationship of confidence
when the consulting lawyer provides confidential information to the expert. See id.
134. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 428(1) (1958).
135. See id. § 401 ("An agent is subject to liability for loss caused to the principal by
any breach of duty."); id.§ 428 cmt. e (providing that the subagent is subject to the
same liability as an agent for the violation of duties to the principal, except that the
subagent is not liable for the mere breach of a contract). For a discussion of the
specific duties owed by agents and subagents, see supra notes 118-23 and
accompanying text.
136. Under section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the beneficiary
of an agreement between a promisor and a promisee has a right of action against the
promisor.
if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to
effectuate the intention of the parties and either (a) the performance of the
promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the
beneficiary; or (b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to
give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (1979); see Jay M. Feinman, Economic
Negligence § 4.2 (1995). Courts have been reluctant to use third-party beneficiary
theory to confer a right of action in a third person when the attorney is representing a
client, see Feinman, supra, § 9.3.5, but in this instance we have assumed that the
lawyer-expert-consultant has not formed an attorney-client relationship. Thus, if the
consulting lawyer is retaining the lawyer-expert inorder to assist in the representation
of the consulting lawyer's client, the contractual doctrine should apply. It does
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III. To WHOM ARE THE LAWYER-EXPERT'S DUTIES OWED?

According to Sam Dash, he was an outside consultant and adviser

to Ken Starr and to the OIC. 137 In Part II of this Article, I argued that

regardless of whether the relationship was one of attorney and client,
Dash owed at least some duties of competence, loyalty, and

confidentiality to some person or entity. In Part III, my purpose is to
identify precisely the person or entity to whom these duties were

owed. Of course, the answer to this question may depend not only on
the specific relationship(s) formed (i.e., attorney-client or otherwise),
but also on the particular context in which the question is raised (e.g.,
disqualification or civil liability). Nevertheless, for purposes of this
part, I am going to assume both that the relationship was one of

attorney-client and that identifying the client(s) will answer the
question to whom Dash's duties were owed.

admittedly

simplifying

assumptions,13

there

Even with these

are

interesting

complexities in the Dash-Starr/OIC relationship, each of which may

have important ramifications beyond the particular case.

These

complexities involve: 1) the difficulty of client identification in

representation involving governmental officials and agencies;3 9 2) the
ambiguity present whenever a lawyer undertakes representation
involving both an organization and one or more of its individual

constituents; 14° and 3) the special problems that arise when a

consulting lawyer requests advice on matters relating to that lawyer's
41
ethical responsibilities in relation to the consulting lawyer's client.1

appear, however, that under Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 302, the
lawyer-expert-consultant could avoid liability by explicitly stating in the agreement
with the consulting lawyer that no third party beneficiary rights are being created. See
id. § 4.2 ("[T]he initial clause of § 302(1) clearly states that the parties have the power
by their agreement to prevent the creation of third party beneficiary rights.").
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the consulting lawyer would agree to such a provision,
because to do so might be in derogation of duties owed by the consulting lawyer to
the client.
Of course, third party beneficiary theory will not apply when the purpose is to
benefit the consulting lawyer and not the client. See infra Part III.C. (discussing client
identification problems involving ethics consultations).
137. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
138. See Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentialityand the
Government Lawyer, 5 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 291,296 (1991). Cramton states:
Normally, the identification of a lawyer-client relationship is a predicate to
determining the lawyer's duties. Once a person is determined to be a
lawyer's client, then the fiduciary and other obligations of a lawyer to that
person attach: competence, confidentiality, diligence, loyalty (avoidance of
conflict of interest), zeal and the like. However, the simplicity of this
approach, in which duties flow inexorably from the existence of the lawyerclient relationship, belies the complexity of actual practice.
Id.
139. See infra Part III.A.
140. See infra Part III.B.
141. See infra Part III.C.
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A. Who Is a Government Lawyer's Client?
At least one commentator has suggested that Dash's publication of
his resignation letter may have been justified precisely because Dash
was an attorney with the OIC-a government agency. According to a
media report, this commentator noted the irony that Dash's conduct
was "governed by court rulings-won by Starr's office during the
Whitewater/Lewinsky investigation-that chipped away at the notion
of an attorney-client privilege for government lawyers."' Indeed, the
commentator was quoted as saying, "[w]hatever duty of loyalty Dash
has to the Office of Independent Counsel is trumped by the public's
right to know and Dash's right to speak."' 43
It is certainly true that Starr's office won court rulings that raised
questions regarding the existence and scope of the attorney-client
privilege in the context of representing government agencies,"' but
these rulings do not appear to justify Dash's conduct in this case.
First, even on the narrow question involving the evidentiary privilege,
these cases held merely that White House lawyers could be compelled
to reveal otherwise confidential communications to a duly appointed
Independent Counsel. 14 5 They did not abrogate the attorney-client
privilege with respect to other individuals in other contexts. Second,
even when information is not protected by an attorney-client
evidentiary privilege, a lawyer has a duty of confidentiality under rules
of professional conduct, except in narrowly defined circumstances that
include express or implied consent by the client. "
Although
government clients may consent to a broader spectrum of information
than do non-government clients, 147 it will be difficult for Dash to argue
that either Starr or the OIC consented to the disclosure in this case.148
142. Goldman, Of Sant Dash's Exit, supra note 14 (quoting Professor Bruce Green

of Fordham University School of Law).

143. Id.
144. See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (denying
for reasons of public policy recognition of governmental attorney-client privilege
against federal grand jury's criminal inquiry conducted by Independent Counsel), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998)); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910,
923 (8th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the claim of an executive branch attorney-client
privilege). Both of these decisions are analyzed at length in Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Who 'Owns' the Government's Attorney-Client Privilege?, 83 Minn. L Rev. 473
(1998).
145. See supra note 144.
146. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1998); supra notes 105-06
and accompanying text.
147. See Cramton, supra note 138, at 294-95 (stating that a "government lawyer's
duty of confidentiality does not extend to information that the government has made
available upon request to the public" because the "government in effect has
consented to disclosure"). Professor Cramton also notes that the government
lawyer's duty of confidentiality is complicated by the doctrine of separation of
powers. See id. at 295-96.
148. Dash's communications with Starr and the OIC were not a matter of public
record and thus disclosure was not warranted under the theory that the government
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Nor is there any credible argument that Dash was justified in
publicly disclosing his resignation letter because the "public" was his
real or ultimate client. There are indeed those who have claimed that
government lawyers represent the "public interest. '149
Today,
however, that argument is generally rejected in favor of the view that
government lawyers represent either the agency itselP50 or some other
unit of government,151 and that disclosures of wrongdoing are justified
only to those who have decision-making capability in regard to the
matter in question. 52 Under this view, if Starr's conduct was unlawful,
then Dash may have been justified in making disclosures to
individuals outside the OIC (since Starr is the head of the OIC), but
only to those in a position either to reverse Starr's decisions or to
dismiss him for misconduct.153
Even those who advocate that a government lawyer's duty is to the
"public interest" would probably concede that public disclosure by
such a lawyer is appropriate only when the information would not

consents to the disclosure of information available to the public upon request. See
supra note 147.
149. See Cramton, supra note 138, at 298 (citing various proponents of the "public
interest approach" to client identification in the context of government
representation).
150. See id. at 300-01 (citing various proponents of the "agency approach," under
which the agency is viewed as the client not under all circumstances, but in "the vast
majority of situations").
151. See id. at 301-06 (arguing that in cases involving agency corruption, the
Executive Branch should be viewed as the agency lawyer's client); see also Paulsen,
supra note 144, at 486-92 (stating that in the context of an Independent Counsel
investigation, the client of the White House lawyer is the Executive Branch, not the
White House or the President).
152. Professor Paulsen analogizes the representation of government entities to that
of private entities like corporations. See Paulsen supra note 144, at 513-19. Under the
rules of professional conduct, corporate lawyers are not permitted to disclose
corporate wrongdoing either to the public or to shareholders, when the lawyer's
purpose is protecting the corporation itself. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.13(b), (c) (1998) (providing that if the board of directors refuses to act, the
lawyer may resign and that disclosure outside the corporation is warranted only when
permitted by Rule 1.6, which provides exceptions to confidentiality regardless of the
client's consent). Rather, the corporate lawyer is permitted to refer the matter only
to a "higher authority in the organization," including "referral to the highest authority
that can act in behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law." Id. Rule
1.13(b)(3).
153. Under the Independent Counsel statute then in effect, there was no one who
could actually reverse Starr's decisions, and the ability to remove him for misconduct
was extremely limited. See James P. Fleissner, The Future of the Independent Counsel
Statute: Confrontingthe Dilemma ofAllocating the Power of ProsecutorialDiscretion,
49 Mercer L. Rev. 427, 434-36 (1998) (describing the limited checks on the
Independent Counsel, once he or she has been appointed). If Starr's alleged
misconduct was criminal, Dash might also have been authorized, indeed required, by
applicable federal statutes to disclose the misconduct to designated law enforcement
officials. See Cramton, supra note 138, at 303 (describing the federal lawyer's
statutory duty to report criminal misconduct to either the agency head or to the
Attorney General).
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otherwise be disclosed. Here, however, there is no question that
Starr's appearance before Congress was going to be scrutinized by his
opponents: if Starr's conduct was unlawful, then other lawyers clearly
would be in a position to recognize and widely publicize that fact.
Dash might respond that it was not so much the unlawfid character of
Starr's conduct that was important for the public to know, but rather
the fact that Dash himself believed that Starr's conduct was unlawful.
This argument, however, appears to be merely another way of
claiming that the disclosure was justified by Starr's prior use of Dash's
favorable opinions-that is, creating either an express or implied
consent to future unfavorable opinions. I have previously concluded
that either there was no such consent or, if there was, that the consent
justified only publication of the resignation itself, and not the detailed
contents of the resignation letter."'
In my view, then, although representing government agencies often
entails difficult ethical questions of client identification, these
questions are not seriously implicated in the Dash-Starr relationship.
The same is not true, however, of the ethical issues raised both by the
complexities of entity representation generally and by the unique
aspects of ethical consultations by a consulting lawyer.
B. Representationin the Context of Entities and Their Constituents
Sam Dash apparently did not intend to form an attorney-client
relationship with either Ken Starr or the OIC. Nevertheless, as I
argued in Part I, he may have formed such a relationship with
someone; for example, if he performed legal services that can only be
performed by an attorney representing a client.SS Does that mean
that he represented both Starr, individually, and the OIC? This
question raises client identification and conflict of interest problems
commonly faced by lawyers in representations involving an entity and
one or more of its individual constituents, regardless of whether the
entity is public or private.
Assume, for example, that Attorney, a lawyer, has been retained by
Pres, the president of Corp, a corporation, to advise Pres regarding
her obligations as president of Corp. According to the retainer
agreement, which is signed by "Pres, president of Corp," Attorney will
be compensated by Corp. Who does Attorney represent? The
question may arise after Pres leaves Corp, perhaps when Corp sues
Pres for breach of fiduciary duty, and Pres moves to disqualify
Attorney from representing Corp on the ground that Attorney
formerly5 6 represented Pres in the same or a substantially related
matter.
154. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.

155. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
156. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule

1.9(a) (prohibiting
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Attorney may argue that she was initially retained by Pres, acting
on Corp's behalf, to represent Corp's interest in having Pres comply
with his official obligations. The fact that Corp was paying Attorney's
legal fee is not determinative of Corp's status as a client, 157 but it is
certainly relevant on that question, particularly if Corp has no obvious
interest in providing Pres with personal representation. 158 Coupled

with Corp's own interest in the subject matter of the representation, it
would be difficult not to conclude that Attorney has formed an

attorney-client relationship with Corp itself.
Attorney may then argue that because she represented the entity
itself, it follows that she was not representing any individual
constituent of the entity. In support, she may cite Model Rule 1.13(a),
which states that "[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organization
represents the organization

acting through its duly authorized

constituents."' 59 All this provision does, however, is state that a
lawyer representing an organization does not necessarily represent its
individual constituents."6 Indeed, Rule 1.13(e) expressly states that
"[a] lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its
directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other
constituents," 61subject to the lawyer's compliance with conflict of
interest rules
At this point, Attorney may argue that there was indeed a conflict
of interests between Corp and Pres; therefore, she could not have
representation adverse to a former client on the same or a substantially related
matter). On disqualification as a possible remedy, see Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers § 213 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
157. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(f) (providing that it is
permissible in some circumstances for a lawyer to accept compensation from a third
person for representing a client).
158. Ordinarily, attorney-client relationships are viewed as a matter of contract, in
which case the relevant question is what the parties intended. See Mallen & Smith,
supra note 70, § 8.3, at 568 (providing that in a consensual relationship, the question is
whether a lawyer and client have consented to its formation). There are indeed some
situations in which an organization does have an interest in providing an
organizational constituent with personal representation for example, when both the
organization and the individual are sued by a third person and the organization has
either indemnified the individual or has a contractual obligation to provide the
individual with a defense. See Nancy J. Moore, Ethical Issues in Third-PartyPayment:
Beyond the Insurance Defense Paradigm, 16 Rev. Litig. 585, 602-05 (1997)
[hereinafter Moore, EthicalIssues in Third-PartyPayment]. Sometimes the use of the
corporation's attorney for the personal benefit of a corporate executive is offered
simply as a benefit to the executive, as when the corporation's attorney drafts a will
for the executive or assists in a personal real estate transaction.
159. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13(a) (1998). The Model Code
contains an even more explicit statement. See Model Code of Professional
Responsibility EC 5-18 (1983) ("A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or
similar entity owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director,
officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with the entity.").
160. See Moore, ExpandingDuties of Attorneys, supra note 67, at 677.
161. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13(e) (emphasis added).
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represented both parties without their informed consent.'" Elsewhere
I have argued that it is important to separate the question of the fact
of a representation from the question of whether that representation
3
was proper under applicable rules of professional conduct.'

Thus, if

Attorney expressly or impliedly agreed to represent Pres while
simultaneously representing Corp, then an attorney-client relationship
was formed, regardless of whether Attorney complied with conflict of
interest rules. Similarly, even in the absence of an express or implied

agreement, if Pres reasonably believed that Attorney was representing
his individual interests, and not just those of Corp, then an attorneyclient relationship may have been formed, albeit inadvertently on the
part of Attorney.164 Applying this analysis to Dash's relationship with
Starr and the OIC, it seems clear that if Dash was representing
anyone, it must have been the OIC itself. After all, the agency was
paying Dash's fee, 16 it had a substantial interest in the subject of the
representation," and it had no particular interest in providing Starr
with personal representation.1 6 Nevertheless, there are indications
that Dash may also have been representing Starr individually. For
example, Dash has referred to an agreement he made to advise both
Starr and the OIC.'1 Absent clarification from Dash that his advice
to Starr was given only in fulfillment of his responsibilities to the OIC,
Starr could reasonably have believed that Dash was his lawyer also,
particularly if he viewed Dash as representing him in his official, as
opposed to his personal,capacity. 169
162- See id. Rule 1.7(b).
163. See Nancy J. Moore, The Ethical Duties of Insurance Defense Lawyers: Are
Special Solutions Required? 4 Conn. Ins. J. 259, 263-64 & n.15 (1997) [hereinafter
Moore, The EthicalDuties].
164. As I have argued elsewhere, lawyers typically can avoid unwanted
relationships in these situations, simply by clarifying their role whenever there is a
significant potential for misunderstanding. See Moore, ExpandingDuties of Attorneys,
supra note 67, at 694,704.
165. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
166. The credibility of the OIC and its investigations was clearly a function of the
credibility of Starr himself, who, in the public eye, was the 01C.
167. Government agencies are far less likely to use their lawyers for the personal

benefit of government officials than are private organizations like corporations,

except when the government is legally obligated to provide such representation, as
when a government officer is sued in her individual capacity. See Moore, Ethical
Issues in Third-PartyPayment, supra note 158, at 607 n.97 (citing a state statute that
provides that the government must provide for the defense of employees sued on
account of acts or omissions within the scope of their employment); see also 28
U.S.C.A. § 2679 (1984) (providing the same defense for federal employees).
168. See supra note 30.
169. Professor Paulsen suggests a possible distinction between representation of a
constituent, as an individual, and representation of the office held by the individual
constituent, each of which is in turn distinguishable from representation of the entity
itself. See Paulsen, supra note 144, at 487 (discussing the representation by an
attorney working for the Clinton White House Counsel's office and distinguishing
between representation of (1) Bill Clinton, personally, (2) the office of the President
of the United States, and (3) an entity such as the White House or the executive
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Nor should it matter that there may have been conflicts of interest
between Starr and the OIC, at least on some matters. For example,
these conflicts clearly surfaced when Dash advised Starr in connection
with Starr's decision to continue representing private clients while
serving as Independent Counsel. 170 At that time, there was a
significant risk that Dash's ability to represent each client was
materially limited by his obligations to the other client.171 It is possible
that the dual representation could have proceeded without material
adverse effect; 172 however, it was unclear who could have consented to
the conflict on the OIC's behalf.173 Nevertheless, as I argued earlier,
whether there is an impermissible conflict of interests is irrelevant to
determining whether and with whom an attorney-client relationship
has been formed.
C.

Special Problemsfor Ethics Consultants

If there is ambiguity in a representation involving both an entity
and its individual constituents, it is because the individual constituent
has a personal interest in the subject of the representation, as when a
lawyer advises a corporate president on compliance with her fiduciary

branch of the United States government). There is, however, yet another possibility.
We could, for example, distinguish between representation of the individual
constituent in personal matters and representation of the individual constituent in her
role as officer or employee of the entity. Thus, Starr might readily concede that Dash
was not representing Ken Starr, the citizen, but might argue that rather than
representing the office of the Independent Counsel (an office that Ken Starr simply
happened to occupy), Dash was representing Ken Starr in his official capacity as
Independent Counsel. The difference might become apparent after Starr leaves his
office and attempts either to disqualify Dash from subsequent representation adverse
to Starr in a substantially related matter, or to sue Dash for malpractice for wrongful
advice that caused Starr to incur certain damages. None of this seems likely to occur
in this instance, but might happen to a different government, or corporate official in a
different situation.
170. See Van Natta Jr., supra note 7.
171. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(b) (1998) (providing that
conflict of interest exists "if the representation of [one] client may be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the
lawyer's own interests").
172. See id. (providing that representation of conflicting interests is permissible if
"the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected" and
"the client consents after consultation").
173. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 202 cmt. c(ii). It
states:
When the person who normally would make the decision whether or not to
give consent-members of a corporate board of directors, for example-is
another interested client of the lawyer, or is otherwise self-interested in the
decision whether to consent, special requirements apply to consent ....
Similarly, an officer of a government agency capable of consenting might be
disabled from giving consent when that officer is a lawyer personally
interested in consenting to the conflict.
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duties to the corporation. 74 There is a similar potential for ambiguity
even outside the context of entity representation: whenever a lawyer
representing a client seeks legal advice regarding that lawyer's ethical
obligations in representing the client.
Outside the field of ethics, most lawyer-to-lawyer consultations are
clearly "client-driven," meaning that the consultation is done for the
primary purpose of benefiting the consulting lawyer's client. 5 As a
result, if the consulted lawyer forms an attorney-client relationship
with anyone, it is with the consulting lawyer's client. In the ethics
area, however, it is just as likely that the consultation is "lawyerdriven," meaning that it is done for the primary purpose of benefiting
the consulting lawyer's own interests.1 76 If so, then it may be the

consulting lawyer who reasonably relies on the consulted lawyer and
becomes the inadvertent client.177
In fact, the circumstances surrounding ethics consultations may be
fairly ambiguous.

7

For example, the lawyer may be concerned that

the client is insisting on a course of action that the lawyer believes to
be criminal or fraudulent.7 9

In such a case, it is probably in the

interest of both the consulting lawyer and her client for the lawyer to
obtain an expert's assistance in determining the lawyer's ethical
obligations. How is one to determine whether the consultation was
primarily client or lawyer-driven?'8 Clearly, the consulted lawyer
174. Given the president's interest in the subject of the representation, the
president may reasonably rely on the lawyer to protect her interests, with the possible
result that the lawyer inadvertently forms an unwanted attorney-client relationship.
This is often in conflict with the interests of the lawyer's other client, the corporation
itself. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
175. See Chinaris,supra note 1, at 44.
176. See id.
177. If "reasonable expectations" are what determine the existence of an
inadvertent attorney-client relationship, see supra note 67 and accompanying text,
then one might question whether an inadvertent relationship can be formed with a
"client" who is unaware of the fact of the consultation. Certainly there is an
argument that a consulting lawyer may not ethically associate with another lawyer in
the case without the informed consent of that lawyer's client. See infra note 184 and
accompanying text. If a consulting lawyer does so, then the client may not be bound
by the retention. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Agency § 5 cmt. a (1958) (stating
that a person may be a subagent although the appointing agent has no authority to
appoint him, as when the agent has apparent, but not actual authority to make the
appointment). Nevertheless, it might still be argued that if a consulting lawyer
reasonably relies on the consulted lawyer to protect the client's interest, then it is, in
effect, the client who so relies, through the medium of her legitimately authorized
agent. If the client is thereby harmed, then the client should be permitted to reap the
benefit of her agent's reliance on her behalf. See infra note 187
178. See Chinaris,supra note 1, at 44 ("[I]n the majority of situations these two
motivations [to benefit the lawyer and the lawyer's client] overlap" and "[t]he ethics
consultation may benefit or be needed by both lawyer and client.").
179. See Kershen, supra note 1, at 6 (discussing the necessity of a consultation to
learn lawyer's ethical obligations under Rule 1.2(d) of the Model Rules).
180. Professor Kershen suggests that the possibility that "the outside lawyer may
suggest a course of action that the client will consider disadvantageous to the client's

802

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

should determine at the outset of the consultation who, if anyone, is
the consulting lawyer's client."8 '
Absent such a determination,
however, it is at least arguable that the consulted lawyer has obtained
two inadvertent clients, particularly if the consulting lawyer's client
was informed about, and consented to, the consultation? 8z
desired course of action" indicates that the consultation must be for the lawyer's
benefit and not for the client's. Id. at 4 (discussing how one determines whether
disclosures to an outside lawyer are "impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation" and thus permitted under Rule 1.6(a) without the client's informed
consent). But this is not necessarily so. One can easily imagine a corporate lawyer
consulting a securities lawyer to determine whether a proposed press release would
violate the client's obligations under securities law. The mere fact that the securities
lawyer might render an opinion adverse to the client's proposed course of action does
not mean that the consultation was lawyer-driven rather than client-driven.
The consultation could be considered primarily lawyer-driven if the lawyer already
knows that she wants to withdraw, and the consultation is made with the specific
purpose of determining if the lawyer could be disciplined for so doing. If, however,
the lawyer is genuinely perplexed as to her ethical obligations and has not yet decided
what she would like to do, then the consultation may be properly characterized as
benefiting the lawyer and the client in roughly equal measure.
181. See supra notes 73-74. If the sole client is to be the consulting lawyer, then the
consulting lawyer must be responsible for the consulted lawyer's fee, as there would
be no justification for passing that cost along to the consulting lawyer's client.
Whether the consulting lawyer is authorized to disclose information protected by
Rule 1.6 for the sole purpose of obtaining legal advice for the lawyer herself has been
the subject of continuing debate. Compare Kershen, supra note 1, at 8 (arguing that
disclosure may be justified by the "self-defense" exception of Rule 1.6(b)), with
Pizzimenti, supra note 1, at 21 (arguing that disclosures are not justified except with
the informed consent of the client). Contrary to Professor Kershen's analysis, I
believe that such disclosures are "impliedly authorized" in order to carry out the
representation in most cases, because the lawyer may not be in a position to provide
competent representation until she fully understands her own ethical obligations. See
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(a) (1998). But see Kershen, supra note
1, at 4 (stating that disclosures are not "impliedly authorized" when they are made for
the purpose of benefiting the lawyer and not the client). I agree with Professor
Kershen, however, that it would be better if the rules were amended to provide a
clear exception for lawyers seeking legal advice for themselves. See id. at 10
(proposing amendment to Rule 1.6). The ABA Commission on the Evaluation of
Professional Standards has tentatively proposed such an amendment. See ABA
Comm'n on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(b)(4)
(Proposed Rule 1.6 Public Discussion Draft Mar. 1999). I am the Chief Reporter for
that Commission, although it should be noted that the views expressed in this Article
are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission.
182. If the consulting lawyer has obtained the informed consent of the client, then
it is easier to argue that the client has reasonably relied on the advice of the consulted
lawyer and thereby formed an attorney-client relationship with that lawyer. Obtaining
such consent does not, however, eliminate the possibility that the consulted lawyer
has also formed an attorney-client relationship with the consulting lawyer herself. For
example, it has been argued that the consulting lawyer may not disclose information
about the client without that client's informed consent, even if the consulting lawyer
expressly retains the consulted lawyer to represent the consulting lawyer in the
matter. See Kershen, supra note 1, at 6-8 (discussing the difficulties associated with
finding such disclosures justified by recognized exceptions to client confidentiality
rules). Thus, even if a consulting lawyer does inform the client and obtains the
client's consent to the consultation, the consulting lawyer may still view the
consultation having been done primarily for the lawyer's own benefit.
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As in the entity representation cases, it might be argued that the
lawyer could not be representing both lawyer and client because their
interests are, or may be, in conflict.1s3 Similarly, it might be argued
that there can be no attorney-client relationship without the informed

As I argued earlier,
consent of the consulting lawyer's client.'
however, the fact of a representation is a question that should be
considered separately from its ethical propriety.Is5 Thus, conflict of
interest or not, if both the consulting lawyer and her client reasonably
rely on the consulted lawyer to protect their respective interests, then
the consulted lawyer may have formed two attorney-client

relationships. Similarly, the consulting lawyer may have acted
unethically in associating an ethics expert to assist in representing the
t6
client without first obtaining the client's informed consent.
Nevertheless, that impropriety does not necessarily prevent the client
from reaping the benefit of an attorney-client relationship,'81 including
bringing a legal malpractice action if the expert's advice is negligent
and causes harm to the client.lss
Dash's role was not limited to advice on legal ethics issues."8 9

When, however, Starr sought advice regarding the performance of his

183. See supra Part III.B.
184. See Kershen, supra note 1, at 5 (arguing that Model Rule 1.5(e) requires that
the client consent to the employment of the second lawyer); supra note 181.
Professor Kershen does not directly address the question whether the consultation
may itself create duties on the part of the consulted lawyer toward the consulting
lawyer's client. Rather, Professor Kershen is concerned with the propriety of the
consulting lawyer's disclosure of confidential information.
185. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 61; see also Pizzimenti, supra note 61, at 26-27 (providing a
detailed discussion of Rule 1.5(e) and more explicit provisions in the former ABA
Model Code). Rule 1.5(e) is the only rule that addresses this issue directly. See id.
Even that rule, however, encompasses only situations where the consulted lawyer will
receive a fee. It is unclear what rule would prohibit a consulting lawyer from
associating an unaffiliated lawyer who will work on the case for no legal fee.
Professor Pizzimenti discusses the applicability of Rule 12(a), which allocates
decision-making responsibility between lawyer and client, as well as commentary
suggesting that a lawyer may not take action important to the client without at least
informing the client of the proposed action. See id. at 31.
187. As a matter of agency law, the client may be in a position to choose between
disavowing the attorney-client relationship when the consulting lawyer lacked even
the apparent authority to engage the consulted lawyer as a subagent and ratifying the
relationship. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 82 (1958) (describing
ratification).
188. Consider, for example, a lawyer who retains local counsel without first
obtaining the client's informed consent. Assume further that local counsel knows that
the consulting lawyer is relying on local counsel to file an answer in the matter. If
local counsel negligently fails to do so, and the case is dismissed, then it is difficult to
imagine a court holding that the client does not have a cause of action in legal
malpractice against local counsel.
189. See Van Natta Jr., supra note 7 ("Dash had played an active and influential
role in Starr's inquiry... helping to broker an immunity deal ... and assisting in the
writing and editing of the impeachment referral.").
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role as a lawyer representing a client,"9 identification of Dash's client
or clients became even more complicated than in the typical entityconstituent scenario. Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
determine whether the consultation (or each consultation), 191 was
primarily client or lawyer-driven. Nevertheless, if Starr consulted
Dash and then relied on his advice because it benefited his own
interests in adhering to applicable ethical standards, then it is
certainly more than likely that Dash will be found to have represented
two clients and not one.
CONCLUSION
As I hope I have demonstrated in this Article, the ethics of ethics
(and other) consultations is a subject of both great complexity and
increasing importance. This fact was brought home to me when I
learned that the very same issues I saw arising in law professor
consultations were being raised in the discussion about lawyers in
multidisciplinary practice firms, who justify their activities by insisting
that they are performing "consulting services," not "legal services."
Of course Sam Dash was not part of any multidisciplinary practice
group. Nor is there any indication that Dash attempted to tailor his
relationship with either Starr or the OIC to avoid either unauthorized
practice laws or malpractice liability. Rather, it would appear that
Dash sincerely believed that he could best perform his role as
"independent consultant" by viewing himself more like a neutral
expert than a partisan attorney.
Nevertheless, the saga of Dash's highly public resignation suggests
that lawyers and law professors should think carefully before entering
into so-called "consulting" arrangements. Under the reasonable
expectations test, these lawyers may inadvertently form attorneyclient relationships with either the consulting lawyer or the consulting
lawyer's client. Moreover, even when any potential ambiguity is
avoided by a written agreement explicitly negating the existence of an
attorney-client relationship, such an agreement may be found invalid
as a matter of public policy if the lawyer is later determined to have
provided legal rather than non-legal services. Even if a lawyer's status
190. Prosecutors are unusual in that they are not only lawyer-advocates, but also
government officials invested with the attributes of the client. See Model Rules of

Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 cmt. (1) (1998). Some commentators prefer to view

prosecutors as lawyers without clients. See Wolfram, supra note 84, § 13.10.1, at 759.
The independent counsel, however, is best viewed as a lawyer representing the
executive branch of government. See supra Part III.A. In any event, prosecutors are
certainly lawyers who will from time to time need legal advice on complying with
their obligations under rules of professional conduct and other law.
191. Rather than a single consultation, or even a series of consultations, on a single
issue, Dash's continuing relationship with Starr apparently consisted of a series of
consultations on numerous separate issues, some of which may have been primarily
client-driven, while others may have been more lawyer-driven.
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as non-lawyer consultant is upheld, the lawyer certainly owes fiduciary
and other duties to someone, and these duties may not differ
significantly from duties owed by a lawyer to the lawyer's client.
Finally, it is important to clarify at the outset the identity of the
individual or entity to whom these duties are owed.
Client
identification is particularly troublesome in situations involving
relationships between entities and their constituents and those
involving consulting lawyers seeking advice on their ethical
responsibilities toward their clients.
When I first began teaching legal ethics over twenty years ago, I
often made up fanciful hypotheticals in order to raise issues I thought
would be fun to explore. These days all I have to do is pick up a
newspaper and I am immediately presented with real life problems of
enormous complexity and importance. I apologize to Sam Dash for
choosing to make an example of his relationship with Ken Starr and
the OIC. If he made mistakes, and I believe that he did, these same
mistakes are being made by numerous lawyers and law professors
throughout the country.
Particularly in view of the rise of
multidisciplinary practice, it is important to identify these real life
problems and give them the scholarly attention they deserve.
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